The Economic Incentives for Sharing Security Information by Gal-Or, Esther & Ghose, Anindya
The Economic Incentives for Sharing Security Information∗
Esther Gal-Or † Anindya Ghose ‡
University of Pittsburgh and New York University
August 27, 2004
Abstract
Given that Information Technology (IT) security has emerged as an important
issue in the last few years, the subject of security information sharing among firms,
as a tool to minimize security breaches, has gained the interest of practitioners and
academics. To promote the disclosure and sharing of cyber-security information among
firms, the US federal government has encouraged the establishment of many industry
based Information Sharing & Analysis Centers (ISACs) under Presidential Decision
Directive 63. Sharing security vulnerabilities and technological solutions related to
methods for preventing, detecting and correcting security breaches, is the fundamental
goal of the ISACs. However, there are a number of interesting economic issues that
will affect the achievement of this goal. Using game theory, we develop an analytical
framework to investigate the competitive implications of sharing security information
and investments in security technologies. We find that security technology investments
and security information sharing act as “strategic complements” in equilibrium. Our
results suggest that information sharing is more valuable when product substitutability
is higher, implying that such sharing alliances yield greater benefits in more competitive
industries. We also highlight that the benefits from such information sharing alliances
increase with the size of the firm. We compare the levels of information sharing and
technology investments obtained when firms behave independently (Bertrand-Nash) to
those selected by an ISAC which maximizes social welfare or joint industry profits. Our
results help us predict the consequences of establishing organizations such as ISACs,
CERT or InfraGard by the federal government.
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1 Introduction
The increasing ubiquity of the Internet provides cyber attackers more opportunities to misap-
propriate or corrupt an organization’s data resources. According to Jupiter Media Metrix,
computer security breaches could potentially cost e-businesses almost $25 billion by 2006
- up from $5.5 billion in 2001.1 There are many well known examples of cyber-hacking.
Egghead.com faced a massive backlash from its customers after being hacked in 2000 which
contributed to its eventual bankruptcy filing. A security breach at Travelocity in 2001
exposed the personal information of thousands of customers who had participated in a pro-
motion. Established firms like Citibank, Microsoft and NASA, among others have been
targeted, too. Hence both the federal government as well as the private sector have recog-
nized a strong need to improve their cyber-security and to treat the security of critical
infrastructure assets like a strategic initiative, rather than a compliance burden.
For a while now, it has been recognized that a key factor required to improve computer
security is the gathering, analysis and sharing of information related to successful, as well as
unsuccessful attempts at, computer security breaches. This has led the U.S. federal govern-
ment to encourage the establishment of industry-based Information Sharing and Analysis
Centers (ISACs) under PDD 63.2 Further, in February 2003, the President also issued The
National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace. ISACs are meant to facilitate the sharing of security
information to enhance and protect critical cyber infrastructure. In January 2001, nineteen
of the nation’s leading high tech companies announced the formation of a new Information
Technology Information Sharing and Analysis Center (IT-ISAC) to cooperate on cyber se-
curity issues in the private sector. Using the shared information, the IT-ISAC disseminates
an integrated view of relevant information system vulnerabilities, threats, and incidents to
its members. It also shares the best security practices and solutions among its members,
and thus provides an impetus for continuous improvement in the effectiveness of security
1“Privacy Worries Plague E-Biz,” http://cyberatlas.internet.com/markets/retailing/article.html
2In addition, on October 16, 2001, President Bush issued Executive Order 13231, “Critical Infrastructure
Protection in the Information Age,” which continued many PDD 63 activities.
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products.3 Obviously, such mutual collaboration is intended to increase the technological
effectiveness of IT security products, thereby increasing their demand.
Revealing information about security breaches to an information sharing alliance (ISA)
results in both costs and benefits for the revealing firm. Losses can occur when a competing
firm or a third party hacks the database of the ISA itself and leverages the shared infor-
mation to make competitive gains. Further, it could malign the reputation of the breach
revealing firm, by anonymously reporting it to the public. In January 2003, Next Generation
Software Services (NGSS) claimed that CERT (Computer Emergency Response Team), the
government-sponsored Internet security reporting center, passed vulnerability information to
third parties about which NGSS had notified CERT. NGSS felt this was a direct violation of
trust, since the information was leaked to potential competitors of NGSS. Eventually, NGSS
severed ties with CERT.4 Another recent incident involved leakage of information on a fatal
flaw in a Sun Microsystems Internet software package to a public mailing list. The hacker
intercepted the documents from CERT and posted an advisory containing the bug’s specifics
to the Full-Disclosure security mailing list.5
The potential costs of sharing security information can have a snowball effect, accruing
from the resultant loss of market share and stock market value from negative publicity
(Cavusoglu, Mishra and Raghunathan 2002, Campbell et al., 2003). In a 2002 report by
Jupiter Media Metrix, IT executives revealed they were more concerned with the ripple
effects of online security breaches on consumer confidence and trust in e-business than the
actual financial losses of physical infrastructure. Negative exposure and loss of reputation
as a result of reports of information infrastructure violations could be a threat to consumer
confidence in a firm’s products. Diminished customer confidence and a tarnished reputation,
can lead to reduced revenues at an increasing rate.6
3A similar organization includes the Chemical Industry Cyber-Security Information Sharing Network.
Other ISACs have been formed in Financial Services, Telecommunications, Energy, Chemicals, etc.
4“NGSS severs ties with CERT,” www.infoworld.com/cgi-bin/ displayNewsArchive.pl?day=030129&week=yes
5“Leaked Bug Alerts Cause a Stir,” http://www.wired.com/news/infostructure, 03/19/03.
6Newmann (1999) mentions that the indirect costs of cyber crime are substantial and growing exponen-
tially. http : //www.oas.org/juridico/english/information system adversities.ahtm
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However, there are several positive aspects to sharing security information. The benefit
from mutual sharing of actual or attempted security breach information can be partitioned
into a private firm specific benefit and an external industry level benefit. This private ben-
efit includes both the prevention of further security breaches in the future (e.g., identifying
and repairing vulnerabilities in their information security systems) as well as increased sales
resulting from more effective security products, and better security reputation among con-
sumers.7 Schecter and Smith (2003) show that information sharing by firms can act as a
deterrent for hackers, thereby indirectly increasing the effectiveness of security technologies.
In Business-to-Business markets, firms who join an ISAC often have big corporations as
customers. For instance in the IT-ISAC, the customers of security vendors like Symantec
and Computer Associates include big corporations like Procter & Gamble, Lockheed Martin
and Citibank, among others. As customers perceive improvement in the effectiveness of cy-
ber security products – accruing from the information sharing behavior of security vendors
(who are members of the IT-ISAC) – their overall confidence increases, leading to increased
demand for IT security products. Hence, security technology investments and security in-
formation sharing can involve demand side spillovers, which result in positive externalities
for the industry as a whole. One of the main purposes of this paper is to focus on such
demand-enhancing benefits of security information sharing alliances.
1.1 Research Questions & Results
For any organization focused on the reporting and dissemination of information related to
security breaches, there are a number of interesting economic issues that will affect the
achievement of this goal. We seek to address the following questions in this paper. (i)What
are the economic incentives for competing firms in a given industry to share security in-
formation through an information-sharing organization like an ISA? (ii) How do market
characteristics such as the degree of intra-industry competitiveness, firm size and mode of
7By reporting a security breach to a central monitoring agency like CERT, a firm can send a strong
message to its customers that it is committed to developing rigorous information security procedures and
that it takes all necessary steps to mitigate damages from future breaches (Schenk and Schenk 2002).
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conduct impact such sharing behavior among competing firms? (iii) Do spillover effects on
demand side or cost side, debar firms from sharing security information and result in sub-
optimal levels of security technology investment? (iv) What is the impact of such sharing
alliances on social welfare when firms individually engage in profit maximization, when the
ISA dons the role of a social planner, and when it acts as a joint profit maximizer?
We find that security information sharing and security technology investments can act as
“strategic complements” in that an increase in information sharing or technology investments
by one firm will induce the other firm to increase its own level of information sharing or
technology investments. In fact, this inclination to share information and invest in security
technologies increases as the degree of competitiveness in an industry increases. The extent
of information sharing and investment levels of firms introduce two effects in our model : a
“direct effect” of expanding demand and a “strategic effect” of alleviating price competition.
We demonstrate that these two effects increase with the size of the firm. We extend our
model to show that the nature of security technology cost plays a pivotal role in determining
whether cost-based spillovers boost information sharing or subdue it. In particular, the
incentives for sharing and investment are weakened if sales volume-related cost spillovers
are present, in comparison to spillovers on fixed costs. We further show that information
sharing levels and technology investments are higher when firms join an ISA sequentially
than when firms compete simultaneously. This happens due to tacit collusion induced by
the first entrant’s precommitment to share a given level of security information and invest a
given amount in security technology. This leads to higher profits for both firms. Finally, we
point out that if a federally funded ISA were to don a social planner’s role, it would need to
provide higher incentives for firms to share welfare-maximizing levels of security information,
rather than the individual or joint profit maximizing levels.8
8In Appendix B, we also allude to an incentive mechanism designed by the government for fostering
socially optimal levels of disclosure.
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1.2 Prior Literature
Questions on information sharing, economic incentives, and social welfare similar to those
noted above have been previously studied in the context of other organizations. Of particular
relevance is the extensive literature on trade associations (TAs). Previous relevant work
includes that on information sharing (e.g., Gal-Or 1985, Shapiro 1986 and Vives 1990).9 The
second stream of literature relevant to our work is that on mode of conduct and strategic
effects (Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer 1985 and Gal-Or 1986). More recently, Parker
and Van Alstyne (2001) show how free strategic complements can raise a firm’s own profits.
Of course, since an organization must expend resources to develop technology, methods and
procedures to deal with information security breaches, sharing of this information will be
qualitatively different than sharing the type of information modelled in the TA literature.10
Finally, our model considers spillovers from security technology investments. Spillovers have
been addressed in the extensive economics-based literature on research joint ventures (d’
Aspremont and Jacquemin 1988, and Kamien, Muller and Zhang 1992).
Recent papers dealing with the economics of information security and protection of crit-
ical infrastructure include Anderson (2001) who discusses various distorted incentives in the
information security domain implied by the existence of moral hazard and adverse selection
problems. Gordon and Loeb (2002) present a framework to determine the optimal amount
of investment to protect a given set of information and Gordon, Loeb and Lucyshyn(GLL)
(2003) discuss the importance of security information sharing. The focus of GLL is on
how information sharing affects the overall level of information security. They highlight the
tradeoff that firms face between improved information security and the potential for free
riding, which can lead to under-investment in security expenditures. While GLL focus on
the cost side effects of security breaches and information sharing, our paper focuses on the
9The information shared in these models is either information concerning an industry’s demand parameter
(common to all participants), or information concerning a cost parameter that is specific (a private value)
to the individual firm. In our model, the information shared is about information security.
10In particular, we do not consider any uncertainty in the information which is available to firms. Rather,
we find a different way to capture the extent of information sharing, without incorporating the noisiness of
the information.
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demand side effects. In particular, we highlight the strategic implication of competition
in the product market on information sharing and security technology investment levels.11
As we proceed through the paper, we clearly identify how our results are related to GLL,
wherever relevant.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model in detail
and presents the main results under simultaneous competition (Bertrand-Nash) mode. We
contrast these with a social planner’s level of information sharing and technology investments.
In Section 3 we analyze the equilibrium under a sequential mode of entry. Section 4 considers
the scenario when technology costs are influenced by the volume of sales. We conclude with
some implications in Section 5. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix in Section 6.
2 Model
We consider a market consisting of two firms producing a differentiated product in a two-
stage non-cooperative game. In the first stage, firms i and j simultaneously choose optimal
levels of security technology investment which we denote as (ti, tj) and security information
sharing levels which we denote as (si, sj). In the second stage, they choose prices (pi, pj)
simultaneously. We consider a Subgame Perfect equilibrium of this game using backward
induction. In this paper, we interchangeably use the words Bertrand-Nash and simultaneous,
to denote this mode of firm conduct.12
We normalize the amount of security information being shared so that it always lies be-
tween 0 and 1, i.e., si ∈ [0, 1]. If si = 0, no information is shared; if si = 1, all information
is shared. The variable ti is an aggregate measure of the extent of investment in security
technology. Since such investment entails allocating resources to possibly multiple technolo-
gies measured in terms of different physical units, we measure ti in terms of one selected
11In GLL, information sharing costs and benefits are captured by examining the effect of security invest-
ment on expected security breach losses. In contrast, we explicitly model such costs and benefits on the
demand and cost facing each firm.
12Although firms compete a la Bertrand, they never reach marginal cost pricing because they sell differen-
tiated products. We use the terminology Bertrand-Nash to indicate that firms compete by choosing prices
as their strategies.
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technology as a numeraire.
We assume that the cost of investing in improved security technology depends upon the
firm’s own investment level as well as the level of security chosen by the competitor and
the extent to which the competitor is willing to share information about its vulnerabilities.
Essentially, the intuition is that the disclosure of vulnerabilities in a particular type of security
technology by one firm leads the other firm to invest less in that technology or procure a
smaller amount of that product. For instance, if firm i were to report a higher number of
security breaches due to a particular kind of firewall, firm j would invest less in that specific
technology. A direct consequence of such information sharing would be preemptive cost
savings in technology investment.
Incorporating the existence of positive cost spillovers, we specify the costs of investing
in security technology in terms of the function f i(ti, yj), where yj = λctjsj and
∂f i
∂ti
> 0 and
∂f i
∂yj
< 0. Hence each firm’s costs rise with its own aggregate investment but decline with the
competitor’s aggregate investment and its willingness to share information. The coefficient
λc is a cost spillover parameter, that we normalize to be in the unit interval. (GLL use a
similar formulation.) We also assume that ∂f
i(0,yi)
∂ti
= 0, ∂
2f i
∂ti∂yj
< 0, and ∂
2f i
∂t2i
> 0. That is,
the marginal cost of increased security investment is zero when no such investment is made.
The marginal cost is decreasing when the competitor increases its investment in security
technologies or shares more information about its security vulnerabilities, and this marginal
cost is increasing with the firm’s own investment level.13 For simplicity, we assume that
firms’ do not incur any production costs other than those stemming from investments in
improved security technology.
We assume that the demand facing each product is linear in self and cross-price effects
(see McGuire and Staelin 1983).
qi = ai − b1pi + b2pj +Bi i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j, (1)
where 0 ≤ b2 < b1. From this point onwards, we will continue to designate the firm under
13This assumption is required to guarantee the existence of an interior solution.
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consideration as firm i and its competitor as firm j. As well, in describing the behavior of both
firms in terms of a system of equations, as expressed in (1), we will drop the qualification,
i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j for brevity.
The variable ai in (1) is the initial intercept of demand facing i. This intercept may shift
upward due to the firms’ investments in improving security as well as sharing information
about their vulnerabilities. The variable Bi in (1) measures the potential shift of the demand
intercept facing firm i. The slope b1 can be interpreted as the extent to which consumers are
price sensitive or “disloyal” to a firm’s product, and the slope b2 provides a measure of the
degree of product substitutability. Thus, b2 = 0 implies that firms act as local monopolists,
whereas b1 = b2 corresponds to the case when products are perfectly homogenous.
In the Appendix, we demonstrate that the linear demand model is implied by a quadratic,
and separable of income, utility function. When consumers decide upon the consumption
of two products,14 subject to their budget constraints, the above linear demand is implied.
The linear demand model has been used extensively in marketing and economics, and there
is some research suggesting that comparative statics derived from simpler models may often
hold for more general formulations (Milgrom 1994).
We now proceed to explain how the variable Bi which measures the potential shift of
the demand of intercept of i, depends upon the investments in security and the extent of
information sharing by the firms. We start by evaluating the possible consequences of firms’
decisions to share information about their security breaches. We designate the “leakage
costs” that might be inflicted on firm i as a result of such sharing, by gi(si, sj). Hence,
the level of these costs to firm i, depends on whether or not firm j 6= i has also revealed
information about its security breaches to the ISA. This specification is similar to the loss
function Li assumed in GLL, which measures losses in sales that are incurred by firm i. In
our formulation, though, those losses are a function of the extent of sharing by the firms
instead of being a fixed amount.
14Consumers can decide to diversify their consumption bundle and buy both products in their maximiza-
tion.
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We assume that gi(si, sj) is increasing in si but decreasing in sj. As the extent of sharing
by i increases, it is more likely that there could be a leakage of the security breach informa-
tion that this firm has experienced. This, in turn, would increase consumers’ apprehension
of transacting with this firm, and thereby reduce its demand intercept. However, as the
competitor’s sharing level increases as well, some consumers may find it optimal to switch
from firm j to firm i, given that j′s security breaches are more likely to be revealed. We
assume that the rate at which these leakage costs increase in si and decrease in sj, is in-
creasing. Specifically, ∂
2gi
∂s2i
> 0 and ∂
2gi
∂s2j
< 0. This assumption is consistent with the possible
deleterious ripple effects of a security breach information leak on firms’ own market share, as
cited in the Introduction. We also assume that ∂
2gi
∂si∂sj
≤ 0, implying that intensified sharing
by the competitor reduces the marginal leakage cost incurred by the firm.15 Finally, we
assume that the marginal leakage costs vanish when firm i does not share any information.
(i.e., ∂gi
∂si
= 0 when si = 0.)
To guarantee that own effects of sharing on leakage costs exceed cross effects of sharing,
we assume that when s1 = s2, |∂gi∂si | > |
∂gi
∂sj
| and |∂2gi
∂s2i
| > |∂2gj
∂s2i
|. The rationale for this
assumption relates to the two types of consumers that may face each firm: loyal consumers
and switchers. This distinction has been widely used in the marketing literature. (See, for
instance, Narasimhan (1988).) While loyal customers buy either product i or nothing at all,
switchers can be induced to purchase the competing brand j. When si increases around a
symmetric equilibrium, firm i loses both the loyal consumers and the switchers due to the
reduced utility they face from the possibility of increased leakage costs. However, when sj
increases around this equilibrium, firm i gains only the switchers. Hence, any changes in its
own level of sharing affects leakage costs more than changes in the level of sharing by the
competitor.16 The following example satisfies all of the above mentioned properties of the
15In the Appendix, we also illustrate how these assumptions can be derived from a specific utility function.
16In the Appendix, we provide an alternative explanation for the result that own effects on leakage costs
are larger than cross effects. This explanation is based upon the quadratic utility function formulation that
generates the linear demand functions.
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function g(si, sj).
gi(si, sj) = α1s
2
i − α2s2j − α3sisj, where α1 > α2 + α3. (2)
The willingness of the competitor to share information about its security breaches may
have another positive implication on the demand facing the firm. When the consumers
know that the firm is cooperating with a competitor as part of the ISA, to identify the most
effective ways to prevent breaches, they are more confident that the firm’s efforts will indeed
be successful. We measure this additional benefit derived by firm i in terms of the decision
variables chosen by its competitor, firm j, as λ
d
tjsj. Such a specification captures the fact
that the extent of benefit to firm i from information sharing by firm j, depends on what
firm j has to share, which in turn depends on the amount that firm j spends on information
security technology. This positive externality that accrues to the firm depends upon the
value of the spillover parameter λ
d
. As with the cost spillover parameter, here as well, we
assume that λ
d
lies in the unit interval.
Note that the term tjsj in the above formulation coincides with the variable yj in GLL.
While in GLL, this term affects the probability of a security breach, in the present model it
affects the size of the demand. In both cases, though, sharing information results in a positive
externality conferred on competitors. Information on threats, vulnerabilities, and incidents
experienced by others can help firms identify trends, better understand the risks faced, and
determine what preventive measures should be implemented (Dacey 2003b). ISACs also
seek to promote the sharing of technology related to detecting and stopping information
security breaches, as well as ways to repair damage caused by such breaches. Having access
to information about security vulnerabilities and the proposed solutions of the competitor,
can lead to more effective investments in security technologies by the firm.
Finally, the demand intercept facing each firm may shift due to the investments under-
taken by both firms, even in the absence of any information sharing between them. When
a given firm increases its investment in security technology to prevent security breaches or
enhance the effectiveness of security products, and consumers become informed of this in-
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crease, their level of anxiety about transacting with the firm declines, thus enhancing their
expected utility and willingness to pay for the product. In contrast, if the competitor in-
creases its level of investment and consumers become aware of it, the firm may experience a
negative demand shock and lose some customers since the competitor may now be considered
the more reliable and secure source of supply. We summarize this net effect of the firms’
investments on the demand intercept of firm i in terms of the difference (ti − αtj), where
0 ≤ α < 1. Once again, since α is a fraction, own effects of investment exceed cross effects.
Combining the benefits and costs of investments in security technology as well as infor-
mation sharing, yields the following net benefit function that can shift the demand intercept
of firm i17:
Bi = ti − αtj + λdtjsj − gi(si, sj). (3)
Note that the competitor’s level of investment has both positive and negative implications
on firm i′s demand. On the positive side, consumers are reassured that i′s membership in
the ISA is more beneficial to it, given that j reveals information concerning a larger level
of investment. On the negative side, the competitor now appears a more attractive option
to consumers. Since the former effect depends upon the extent of sharing by j, the positive
spillover expression depends on the product tjsj.
2.1 Analysis
At the second stage, firm i chooses its price pi to maximize its objective. The profit function
of firm i can be written as
Πi = piqi − f i(ti, yj).
From the first-order conditions for profit maximization, we derive the second stage equilib-
rium prices, which are summarized in the Appendix. These become the starting point for
17The qualitative nature of our results hold with different formulations of the benefit function. In partic-
ular, any increasing and concave function of (ti − αtj + λdtjsj) can replace the linear specification above
without changing our results. As well, in the Appendix we provide an alternative interpretation to the
“demand effect” benefit component Bi.
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deriving comparative statics to examine how changes in the exogenous and endogenous vari-
ables affect firm strategies and profits under different market conditions. In deriving some
of the comparative statics, we will need the following assumptions:
A1 : α ≤
(
λ
d
min{s1, s2}+ b2
2b1
)
= α¯
A2 :
[
−(2b1∂g
i
∂si
+ b2
∂gj
∂si
)si=sj=1 + b2λdti
]
≤ 0.
Assumption A1 asserts that the negative implications of increased security investment
by the competitor on the firm’s demand is not “too large”. This assumption is more likely
to be valid when the demand spillover parameter λ
d
or the degree of substitutability be-
tween products, b2, is relatively high. Assumption A2 asserts that when both firms share
perfect information, the negative consequences on each firm’s demand, as measured by mar-
ginal “leakage costs” more than outweigh the positive impact as measured by the marginal
“demand spillover” effect.
Proposition 1 (i) A firm’s price increases with an increase in its own investment in security
technology. As well, under Assumption A1, price also increases with the competitor’s level
of investment. Hence, dpi
dti
> 0, and dpi
dtj
> 0.
(ii) Under Assumption A2, each firm’s price follows an inverted-U shaped curve with an
increase in security information sharing, i.e. ∂pi
∂si
> 0 for si ∈ (0, sci) and ∂pi∂si < 0 for
si ∈ (sci , 1), where 0 < sci < 1.
Increased investment in security technology by the firm shifts its demand outwards and
raises its price reaction function. As a result, the firm chooses to raise its prices. When the
competitor increases its security investment level, the competitor’s price reaction function
shifts up. With upward sloping reaction functions, this shift leads the firm to raise its
own price as well, as long as the parameter α is not “too large”. Recall that this parameter
measures the negative consequences of the competitor’s investment level on the firm’s demand
intercept.
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When the firm intensifies its extent of sharing, there are two countervailing effects on
its own demand and that of its competitor. Intensified sharing of security information
increases the firm’s own leakage costs, thus reducing the demand facing it. On the other
hand, due to spillover effects and reduced leakage costs of the competitor, the demand facing
the competitor shifts outwards. Due to the former, direct effect, the firm has an incentive
to reduce its price. However, because of the latter, strategic effect, the competitor has
an incentive to raise its price, which with upward sloping reaction functions, provides an
incentive for the firm to raise its own price, as well. The second part of the Proposition
states that for small values of si < s
c
i , the latter strategic effect dominates and for large
value of si > s
c
i , the former direct effect dominates. Assumption A2 guarantees that perfect
information sharing can never arise in equilibrium, thus leading to an interior solution so
that sci is a fraction. Basically, since the marginal leakage costs with perfect information
sharing is relatively large compared to positive spillovers on demand, perfect information
sharing cannot be an equilibrium.
Substituting the second stage prices back into each firm’s objective function, we can
obtain the first stage payoff function in reduced form as
Πi = b1p
2
i − f i(ti, yj), (4)
where pi solve the first order conditions. Differentiating with respect to the first stage
decision variables yields the following two FOCs.18
dΠi
dsi
= 2b1pi
∂pi
∂si
= 0. (5)
Hi =
dΠi
dti
= 2b1pi
∂pi
∂ti
− ∂f
i
∂ti
= 0. (6)
Lemma 1 (i) Under Assumption A2, full information sharing is inconsistent with a sym-
metric equilibrium. Specifically, the optimal levels of information sharing and security tech-
18Since we do not get closed form solutions for the first stage decision variables, we adopt the implicit
function approach to present our results and gain insight.
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nology investment are given as the solution to[
2b1(
∂gi
∂si
) + b2(
∂gj
∂si
)
]
= b2λdti,
∂f i
∂ti
= 2b1pi
(
2b1 + b2(λdsi − α)
(4b21 − b22)
)
.
(ii) The reaction functions of both firms with respect to the extent of security information
sharing are upward sloping, i.e., ∂si
∂sj
> 0, and ∂ti
∂sj
> 0. As well, under Assumption A1,
the reaction functions of both firms with respect to the extent of security investment are also
upward sloping, i.e. ∂si
∂tj
> 0, ∂ti
∂tj
> 0.
A direct interpretation of these results is provided in the following Proposition.
Proposition 2 (i) A higher level of security information sharing by one firm leads to a
higher level of information sharing and security investment by its competitor. As well, if
α ≤ α¯,
(ii) A higher level of security technology investment by one firm leads to a higher level of
information sharing and security investment by its competitor.
(iii) Security technology investment and security information sharing act as strategic com-
plements in this case .
Our analysis reveals that the reaction functions are upward sloping; that is, an increase
in security technology investment by firm i induces a higher level of information sharing by
firm j and vice-versa. The two inputs act as strategic complements. This is evident from
the fact that ∂
2Πi
∂si∂tj
> 0, i.e., the increase in profits with increased information sharing for
firm i is higher for higher levels of technology investment by firm j and vice-versa. Further,
∂2Πi
∂si∂sj
> 0, i.e., the increase in profits with increased information sharing for firm i is higher
for higher levels of information sharing by firm j and vice-versa. Hence, as we observed in
Lemma 1, firm i responds to less aggressive play by firm j by being less aggressive itself. The
same intuition applies to the change in a firm’s profits with a change in security technology
investment by the other firm, where we find that ∂
2Πi
∂ti∂tj
> 0, when α is sufficiently small.
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Note that the upper bound on α that is stated in Proposition 2 is stronger than necessary.
To guarantee that the slopes ∂si
∂tj
and ∂ti
∂tj
are positive, the parameter α cannot be too large,
but a weaker condition than the one stated in the Proposition is sufficient (a higher upper
bound on α).
Contrary to our results, when GLL use the “restricted cost” function, f i(ti, yj) = f(ti −
yj), they find that when firms share information, each firm has reduced incentives to invest in
information security. The main reason for the different result is the existence of the demand
enhancing effects of information security sharing and technology investments in our model.19
Proposition 3 (i) A lower level of firm loyalty leads to lower levels of security information
sharing and security technology investment, i.e., ∂si
∂b1
< 0, ∂ti
∂b1
< 0. When α ≤ α¯, the extent
of information sharing and amount of security technology investment by both firms increase
when the degree of product substitutability increases, i.e, ∂si
∂b2
> 0, ∂ti
∂b2
> 0.
We highlight that a steeper demand schedule b1, lowers a firm’s propensity to invest in
security technology and share security information. A steeper slope implies that each firm
sells fewer units of the product for a given level of the equilibrium prices.20 Smaller quanti-
ties imply, in turn, that the marginal return to any kind of technology investment is more
limited. As a result, the firms have reduced incentives to invest in enhanced security technol-
ogy. Further, the strategic complementarity between technology investment and information
sharing implies also that the extent of sharing declines when demand schedules are steeper.
Quite interestingly, to the extent that product substitutability is indicative of the degree
of competition in an industry, we find that a higher level of intra-industry competitiveness
may lead to higher levels of security information sharing and increased investment in se-
curity technologies by both firms, when α is sufficiently small. Firms generally respond to
increased competition with aggressive price cuts. In order to alleviate such aggressive price
19Using an unrestricted case, GLL also show that information sharing can lead to an increase in sharing
and in the achieved level of information security.
20Since an increase in b1 implies that consumers are more price sensitive, it leads to a lower level of demand
at a given price.
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competition, firms have greater incentives to invest in mechanisms that alleviate price com-
petition.21 Since increases in s and t may help in mitigating price competition, both firms
may decide to raise the extent of information sharing and investments when the degree of
substitutability between the firms’ products increases.
We would like to point out that the intuition for our comparative statics results with
respect to parameters b1 and b2 follows from the existence of two effects: a direct effect and
a strategic effect. This is evident when optimizing the objective function in Stage 1 with
respect to the decision variables si and ti. Differentiating w.r.t si and ti separately, yields
the following equations.
dΠi
dsi
=
∂Πi
∂si
+
∂Πi
∂pj
∂pj
∂si
+
∂Πi
∂pi
∂pi
∂si
. (7)
dΠi
dti
=
∂Πi
∂ti
+
∂Πi
∂pj
∂pj
∂ti
+
∂Πi
∂pi
∂pi
∂ti
. (8)
Since the prices selected in the second stage solve the condition ∂Πi
∂pi
= 0, in equilibrium
the third term in both equation (7) and equation (8) is equal to 0. The first terms in
equations (7) and (8) measure the direct effect of increased information sharing, and the
second terms in the equations measure the strategic effect. The degree of substitutability,
b2, affects primarily the magnitude of the strategic effect and the degree of disloyalty, b1,
affects primarily the magnitude of the direct effect. Note that the sign of the strategic effect
is positive since from Proposition 1, the competitor raises prices when the firm shares more
security information or increases security technology investment (∂pj
∂si
> 0 and ∂pj
∂ti
> 0).
When b2 increases, the importance of alleviating price competition becomes specially
pronounced, and as a result, firms are willing to share more information and invest more
in security technology. In contrast, when b1 increases the magnitude of the direct effect
declines since each producer sells smaller volumes as a result of the increase in disloyalty of
21For instance, in the airline industry which has been characterized by stiff price competition, firms have
developed Frequent Flyer Programs, as a mechanism to reduce cut-throat pricing.
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consumers. With smaller volumes, firms have lower incentives to make any kind of invest-
ment, including in improving information security. Since security technology and information
sharing are complementary, they also cut back on their extent of sharing. In general, in all
the comparative statics the two effects mentioned above are present. Changes that reduce
size (quantity) reduce the direct effect and therefore, the incentives to invest in technology
and share security information. On the other hand, changes that intensify price competition
increase the strategic effect and, therefore, the incentives to invest and share.
Proposition 4 (i) Security information sharing and security technology investment levels
increase with firm size. (ii) A lower level of demand spillover and cost spillover discour-
ages security information sharing and technology investments, i.e., ∂si
∂λ
d
> 0, ∂si
∂λc
> 0, ∂ti
∂λ
d
>
0, ∂ti
∂λc
> 0. (iii) A bigger value of α discourages security information sharing and technology
investments, i.e., ∂si
∂α
< 0, and ∂ti
∂α
< 0.
Part (i) of Proposition 4 suggests that investing in security information is more valuable
to larger firms, since the marginal return to investment is directly related to the volume of
sales of the firms. This conclusion is consistent with the well known result that a monopolist
benefits more from cost-reducing innovations than a firm competing in a duopoly, given that
it can extract a higher proportion of the surplus from the market.22 Since information sharing
and technology investment act as strategic complements, this increased security investment
also leads to higher security information sharing by the larger firm.
The result stated in part (ii) of Proposition 4 implies that higher “demand-side spillovers”
promote higher levels of information sharing and technology investment. Increased spillovers
shift the demand curve outwards, which enable firms to increase their prices and, as a result,
their profits. Similarly, increased “cost spillovers” imply that the marginal cost of investment
declines, thus providing greater incentives for the firm to intensify security investments and
information sharing. Note that the latter result is implied by our assumption that the cost
22Basically, the extent of incentives to invest in technology and share information, is a function of the
degree of concentration of firms in the market. As the number of firms in the industry decreases, the
marginal benefit from the technology investment and information sharing increases.
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of investing in security information is independent of the firm’s volume of sales. In Section 4,
we demonstrate that “cost spillovers” have an opposite effect to that described in the above
Proposition when the cost of investment is volume-dependent. This opposing effect was also
derived in GLL.
Part (iii) of Proposition 4 evaluates the parameter α, which measures the adverse im-
plications of the competitor’s security investment on the demand intercept of a given firm.
According to this part, bigger values of α discourage technology investments and information
sharing. This result is quite intuitive, as bigger values of α imply lower volumes of sales and,
as explained before, reduced incentives to invest.
2.2 Social Welfare
We now consider the case that the ISA dons the role of a federally funded social planner.
From the demand expressions, one can derive the inverse demand functions in terms of prices
such that pi = Fi(qi, qj). Let q1 = q2 = q
∗ denote the equilibrium quantity determined by
the market. Focusing on a symmetric environment, where the social planner sets t1 = t2 = t,
s1 = s2 = s and F1(q, q) = F2(q, q) = F (q, q), social welfare can be written as follows :
SW = 2
∫ q∗
0
F (q, q) dq − 2f i(t, λcts) = 2
∫ q∗
0
a+B − q
b1 − b2 dq − 2f
i(t, λcts) (9)
where B = t(1− α) + λ
d
ts− gi(s, s). (10)
In the Appendix, we show that the social welfare maximizing level of information sharing
is higher than the solution to ∂B
∂s
= 0. This last condition implies that the direct net marginal
benefit of information sharing on each firm’s demand is equal to zero. Using equation (10),
∂B
∂s
= λ
d
t− (∂g
i
∂si
+
∂gi
∂sj
) = 0. (11)
When each firm maximizes its own profits under a Nash equilibrium, it chooses the extent
of information sharing to satisfy ∂pi
∂si
= 0. Hence the optimal level of information chosen at
the market equilibrium, sNE∗ satisfies the following condition :
λ
d
t− (2b1
b2
∂gi
∂si
+
∂gi
∂sj
) = 0. (12)
18
Since 2b1
b2
> 1, it follows from comparing equation (12) with (11), that for a fixed level of
security technology investment, the socially optimal level of information shared is higher
than that chosen under the Bertrand Nash market equilibrium where firms are engaged in
individual profit maximization.
Next, we consider the case where the ISA coordinates the choices of its members, in
terms of their security technology investments and extent of information sharing, in order
to maximize joint industry profits. In spite of this coordination on the choice of s and t, we
assume that the ISA is prohibited from facilitating price coordination among its members.
Prices are still given, therefore, by equation (21) (in the Appendix), which at the symmetric
equilibrium reduces to
p∗ =
a+B
2b1 − b2 .
Since q∗ = b1p∗, joint industry profits can be expressed as follows :
ΠJP = Π1 +Π2 =
2 b1 (a+B)
2
(2b1 − b2)2 − 2f
i(t, λcts).
The ISA chooses s and t to maximize the above payoff function. The optimization with
respect to s and t yields the conditions, respectively.
∂ΠJP
∂s
=
4b1 (a+B)
(2b1 − b2)2
∂B
∂s
− 2λct
∂f i
∂yj
= 0. (13)
∂ΠJP
∂t
=
4b1 (a+B)
(2b1 − b2)2
∂B
∂t
− 2[∂f
i
∂ti
+ λcs
∂f i
∂yj
] = 0. (14)
A comparison of equations (13) and (14) with (27) and (28) (from the Appendix) when
α ≤ α¯ implies that maximizing social welfare yields higher levels of sharing and security
technology investment than that chosen under joint profit maximization. A similar compar-
ison of equations (13) and (14) with (12) and (29) (in the Appendix), yields that joint profit
maximization yields higher levels of sharing and security investment than that obtained at
the market equilibrium. In Proposition 5, we summarize the comparison of the extent of
information sharing and technology investment under the three regimes discussed above :
welfare maximization, joint profit maximization, and individual profit maximization.
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Proposition 5 (i) Social welfare at the symmetric Bertrand equilibrium is higher with se-
curity information sharing than with no sharing. (ii) When α ≤ α¯, the level of security
information sharing and security technology investment that are socially optimal are higher
than those selected by an ISA whose objective is to maximize joint industry profits. Moreover,
a joint profit maximizing ISA chooses higher levels of information sharing and technology in-
vestment than those selected at the market equilibrium, when firms are engaged in individual
profit maximization.
The comparison presented in Proposition 5 can be explained by recalling the different
objectives of the social planner, the joint profit maximizing ISA, and the individual firms.
While the ISA’s objective is to maximize total industry profits, the social planner aims to
maximize the sum of the consumer and producer surplus. Hence, the joint profit maximiz-
ing ISA implements lower levels of technology investment and security information sharing
than the social planner, since it does not incorporate the added benefit to consumers from
enhanced technology investments. The reason the joint profit maximizing ISA wishes to im-
plement higher levels of information sharing and security technology investment than firms
that choose these decision variables independently, stems from the fact that individual firms
do not fully internalize the positive externality that the investment confers on their competi-
tors, when α ≤ α¯. Hence, this decreases the marginal return from information sharing and
technology investment.
The result reported in Proposition 5 implies that the government should encourage indus-
try participants to cooperate in setting their security investments and information sharing
levels. Even if their coordination does not result in socially optimal levels of investment
and sharing, it still yields an improvement over the outcome attained in the absence of co-
ordination. This conclusion is valid, however, only if members of the ISA do not use those
coordination activities as a vehicle to collude on prices. If formation of the joint profit maxi-
mizing ISA facilitates such collusion, the members may raise prices above the Bertrand-Nash
level and consequently, reduce social welfare. Whereas prices at the Bertrand-Nash equilib-
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rium are equal to pNE = a+B
2b1−b2 , price under collusion is the monopoly price p
JP = a+B
2(b1−b2) .
For a fixed level of security technology investment, the higher prices selected under collusion
result in reduced quantities demanded by consumers, since qJP = a+B
2
< b1 (a+B)
2b1−b2 = q
NE.
Given that quantities at the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium qNE∗ fall short of the socially op-
timal level of production qSW
∗
, the further decline of quantities due to collusion in pricing
reduces social welfare. This points out the need for legislation which would allow an ISA to
choose levels of security information sharing but prevent members from colluding in prices.
Our result that information sharing is social welfare enhancing is also consistent with
the findings of GLL (2003) who posit that at the Nash equilibrium, a small increase in
expenditures on information security by either firm would increase social welfare. They also
point out that the socially optimal expenditure levels for each firm is greater than the Nash
equilibrium levels. However they highlight that this may not hold true for both firms at the
same time, if there is asymmetry among firms in terms of IT security productivity.
3 Sequential Entry
Analytical modelers have recognized that the qualitative insights regarding market equi-
libria often depend on the sequence in which firms in an industry choose their strategies.
While the simultaneous mode of conduct is more common in fragmented industries, there
are numerous examples where one firm acts as a leader and others act as followers in a given
industry. Firms may understandably be reluctant to share sensitive proprietary informa-
tion on security practices, intrusions and actual crimes with either government agencies or
competitors. To many firms, information sharing is a risky proposition with less than clear
benefits. Specifically, concerns have been raised that a firm’s information could be subject
to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), or face potential liability concerns for informa-
tion shared in good faith (Dacey 2003b). These actions could potentially jeopardize a firm’s
market share or customer base. This may be especially true when some firms are more likely
to be pioneering in their approach to disclosing critical information while others adopt a
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“wait and watch policy.”23 It may be interesting, therefore, to compare the amount of secu-
rity information sharing and technology investment when firms join an ISA in a sequential
manner, with the case when they make their choices simultaneously.
Hence, we consider a scenario where an incumbent firm has already committed to sharing
information and investing in technology, anticipating the entry and similar sharing behavior
of another firm. In stage 1, the incumbent chooses (si, ti), and in stage 2, the entrant chooses
(sj, tj). In stage 3, both firms choose prices (pi, pj) simultaneously. With sequential choices,
the first-order conditions for firm i (incumbent) are as follows.
Gi =
dΠi
dsi
= 2b1pi
∂pi
∂si
+ 2b1pi
∂pi
∂sj
∂sj
∂si
+ 2b1pi
∂pi
∂tj
∂tj
∂si
= 0 (15)
Hi =
dΠi
dti
= 2b1pi
∂pi
∂ti
+ 2b1pi
∂pi
∂tj
∂tj
∂ti
+ 2b1pi
∂pi
∂sj
∂sj
∂ti
− ∂f
i
∂ti
= 0. (16)
Note, however, that the FOCs for the follower will be similar to those in the simultaneous
mode, given by equations (5) and (6).
Proposition 6 The optimal amount of shared security information and security technology
investment by firm i(incumbent) will be higher in the sequential mode than in the simulta-
neous mode, provided that α ≤ α¯.
Comparing first order conditions (FOCs) given by equations (15) and (16) with (5) and
(6), implies that with sequential entry, each FOC of the leader includes an additional positive
term that reflects the “Stackelberg effect.” This effect occurs because the leader incorporates
the implication of its own investment (ti) and sharing (si) on the choice of the levels of
investment (tj) and sharing (sj) made subsequently by the follower. The leader knows,
in particular, that such a precommitment to increase the security technology investment
or shared security information will induce the entrant to do the same.24 Since increased
information sharing and technology investment leads to softening of price competition, both
23Starting with October 2000, there were only 277 members who had joined InfraGard. By early January
2001, 518 entities had joined. As of February 2003, InfraGard members totaled over 6,700 (Dacey 2003a).
24By choosing a higher level of (si, ti), the leader moves in a direction that is favorable for both firms and
thus convinces the entrant to follow suit. This in turn, results in improved opportunities for tacit collusion.
22
firms’ profits will be strictly higher in the sequential mode than in the simultaneous mode
game. Proposition 6 suggests that security information sharing and security technology
investment are indeed higher in the former than in the latter mode, leading to higher profits
due to further alleviation of price competition.25
4 Impact of Volume Related Costs
Many firms believe that increased efficiency may be attained by outsourcing the information
security function. Hence, some firms have outsourced their security and network manage-
ment to an external entity like a managed security services provider (MSSP). This entity
engages in modulation of security resources and services, depending on control/variability.26
During the course of outsourcing, an MSSP often provides different levels of quality of se-
curity service(QoSS) based on the size of the firm. Given that the payment to the MSSP
may depend upon the firm size, it would be appropriate to modify our model by including
some additional technology costs which are affected by the volume of sales. Even if the
firm manages its own security, as demand and the corresponding IT infrastructure grows, so
would costs related to installation of additional servers, QoSS license fees, Dynamic Security
Service agreements, increasing utilization of associated security weapons like Firewalls, In-
trusion Detection Systems (IDS), Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), Content filters, Access
control systems, etc. In this section, we analyze the impact of sales-volume related costs of
technology on firms’ optimal sharing and investment strategies.
Having considered cost spillovers on fixed costs, we now consider only spillovers on se-
curity technology costs which are influenced by the volume of sales. We model the new
marginal cost function as (c− λˆtjsj)δ(ti) and assume that δ′ > 0, δ′′ > 0. The parameter λˆ is
25It is also possible to consider the scenario in which technology investments (ti, tj) are chosen first and
simultaneously by firms, followed by information sharing levels in the penultimate stage (si, sj), and prices
(pi, pj) in the last stage. Even in this scenario, higher levels of technology investment and information sharing
arise in equilibrium, compared to the simultaneous mode game considered in the previous section. Proof of
this is available from the authors upon request.
26Examples of variant security include the length of encryption keys, assurance level of remote execution
environment, intensity level of boundary controllers like IDS, firewall etc.
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the “volume related cost-side” spillover from information sharing. In this new environment,
the first stage profit equation in reduced form is
Πi = b1
(
(pi − (c− λˆtjsj) δ(ti)
)2 − f(ti),
where, for simplicity, we assume the non existence of fixed cost spillovers (i.e. λc = 0).
Designating the term (c− λˆtjsj)δ(ti) = Fi, the first order conditions can now be written as :
Gi =
dΠ
dsi
= 2b1(pi − Fi) ∂pi
∂si
= 0. (17)
Hi =
dΠ
dti
= 2b1(pi − Fi) (∂pi
∂ti
− ∂Fi
∂ti
)− f ′(ti) = 0. (18)
From conditions (17) and (18), we can assess how cost side spillovers impact firms’ incentives
to share information and invest in technology. We formally show the following :
Proposition 7 When the costs of security technology investment are affected by the volume
of sales, and there are “volume related cost side spillovers” as captured by the parameter λˆ,
(i) an increase in λˆ has ambiguous implications on the propensity to share security informa-
tion or invest in security technology for both firms.
(ii) Volume related spillovers reduce incentives to share information in comparison to an
environment, where no such spillovers exist.
Changes in the spillover parameter λˆ introduce two countervailing effects. An increase in
λˆ makes firm i′s competitor more efficient, by reducing its unit cost c− λˆtisi. This enables
j to price more aggressively. If firm i increases its level of information shared, it further
increases the cost efficiency of the competitor, which acts to the disadvantage of the firm.
Since the improved cost efficiency precipitates further price competition, both firms respond
strategically by reducing their levels of information sharing. On the other hand, an increase
in λˆ increases the profit margin of each firm, thus providing greater incentives for increased
investment in technology and information sharing. In the Appendix, we demonstrate that
the relative size of the above mentioned effects depends upon the ratio of the two parameters
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measuring demand and volume related cost spillovers, (
λ
d
λˆ
). The smaller this ratio, the bigger
the former effect, implying that increased volume related cost spillovers reduce the incentives
to share information.
It may also be interesting to investigate what happens to the slope of the information
sharing reaction functions. We demonstrate that the information sharing reaction function,
∂si
∂sj
, is not necessarily increasing, unlike in the case when there are no volume related costs of
investing in security technology. In particular, the sign of the slope of this reaction function
is determined by the size of the parameter λˆ. For small values of λˆ, ∂si
∂sj
> 0, and for large,
∂si
∂sj
< 0. Thus, only if volume related cost spillovers are sufficiently small, information
sharing by one firm induces the other firm to share more information. While a higher level
of information sharing fosters greater opportunities for tacit collusion, as derived in earlier
sections, it also leads to a more efficient competitor who faces lower variable costs. Such
a competitor tends to price more aggressively. When the value of λˆ is sufficiently big, the
latter effect is significant, thus reversing the result we have derived in the absence of volume
related cost spillovers.
Volume related spillovers costs yield, therefore, predictions that are more consistent
with the free riding behavior described in GLL or in the R&D literature (d’Aspremont
and Jacquemin 1988, Kamien, Muller and Zhang 1992).27
5 Implications, Conclusion and Extensions
The U.S. federal government has encouraged the formation of Information Sharing & Analy-
sis Centers (ISACs), with the goal of helping protect critical infrastructure assets that are
largely owned and operated by the private sector. This has been witnessed in industries such
as banking & finance, IT, chemicals, oil & gas, electricity, etc. The underlying assumption is
that such centrally coordinated information sharing organizations would facilitate the align-
27This result also corresponds well with GLL who point out that whether or not information sharing
results in an increased level of security depends on the nature of the probability security breach function.
Basically what drives their result is the relative size of the firm’s marginal benefit from an additional dollar
of information security expenditure, at different levels of security investment.
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ment of goals for both the private sector and the federal government, which in turn would
improve the security of cyber-infrastructure assets. However, all sectors do not have a fully
established ISAC, and in those sectors that do, there is mixed participation. Specifically, five
recently reviewed ISACs showed different levels of progress in implementing the PDD 63 sug-
gested activities.28 Hence, the government felt it important to identify economic incentives
to encourage the desired information sharing behavior in IT security (Dacey 2003a).
We develop a model to investigate the benefits to firms from joining such security infor-
mation sharing alliances. Our results point out that there are, indeed, some strong economic
incentives for firms to indulge in such sharing of security information. Increase in security in-
formation sharing yields two benefits for the firms: a “direct effect” which increases demand
and a “strategic effect” which alleviates price competition. These incentives become stronger
with increases in the firm size and the degree of competition. Since such alliances can give
rise to spillover effects, we investigate their impact on sharing and security investment levels.
Importantly, we point out that the nature of the security technology cost function plays a
pivotal role in determining whether spillovers are beneficial or detrimental to firms’ incen-
tives to join an ISA. Another implication of our model is that firms will benefit from joining
an ISA sequentially rather than simultaneously, since such sequentiality positively influences
the levels of information sharing and technology investment.
We find that an increase in security information sharing and security technology invest-
ment levels lead to higher social welfare, compared to the no sharing regime. However, the
equilibrium levels vary depending on whether an ISA enacts the role of a social planner or
a joint profit maximizer. The levels of security information sharing and technology invest-
ment obtained under a market equilibrium fall short of those that maximize social welfare.
Even when the members of an ISA coordinate their information sharing and technology
investment decisions in order to maximize joint industry profits, the extent of sharing and
investment falls short of socially desirable levels. Joint profit maximization yields, however,
28These were the IT, Telecommunications, Energy, Water and Electricity ISACs.
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higher levels of sharing than those obtained at the market (Bertrand Nash) equilibrium, im-
plying that coordination among firms on technology security should actually be encouraged
by the federal government.29 Even if their coordination does not result in socially optimal
levels of technology investment and information sharing, it still yields an improvement over
the outcome attained in the absence of coordination.
Our model shows that when firms face volume related costs, increased spillover effects
do not necessarily encourage firms to share security information. In our analysis, we have
only considered symmetric cost side spillovers, implying that both firms are equally efficient
in utilizing the shared security information in reducing their marginal costs of technology
investment. In future research, we plan to extend the model to allow for asymmetries among
firms in utilizing the cost side spillover benefit. Preliminary investigation indicates that if
firms differ in their intrinsic ability to utilize the shared information, the more efficient firm
may have stronger incentives to under-invest in security technology and have lower incentives
to share information, compared to the less efficient firm. The total effect of a change in the
spillover parameter is not driven by the direct effect of this change alone, but also by the
competitor’s reaction to it. This opens up the possibility of indirect free riding behavior by
the more efficient firm. GLL also point out such a possibility in their model.
ISACs do not seem to have well-designed incentives to prevent firms from free-riding.
Additionally, firms who join such alliances are often concerned about providing competi-
tive advantage to other member firms. Thus, there is a possibility that even after entering
an alliance, firms might renege on sharing security breach information with other member
firms. To mitigate such concerns, the Chemical Industry Cyber-Security Information Shar-
ing Network has put in place standards for authentication and verification of the security
information being shared.
While PDD 63 encouraged the creation of ISACs, it left the actual design and function of
the ISACs to be determined by the private sector in consultation with the federal government
29ISAs should not be allowed to restrain trade by restricting output, coordinating prices, or otherwise
inhibiting competition, on which antitrust laws generally focus.
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(Dacey 2003a). A significant implication of our model is that rigorous empirical studies of
the structure and activities of such information sharing organizations are needed. These
studies would not only determine the actual levels of information sharing taking place among
members of ISACs, but could provide deep insights into the appropriate incentives that may
be required to facilitate such sharing, without causing excessive price increases.30 These
incentives may include various public policy tools related to tax benefits, subsidies, or specific
legislation protecting firms from anti-trust actions. In addition, empirical studies could
address the role of government intervention in the form of optimal incentives or subsidies to
prevent firms from reneging on their information sharing commitments.
Although markets differ in a number of ways, we consider only a limited number of
market characteristics in our research. For instance, in our social welfare analysis, we focus
on only one industry. In reality, a security breach in a critical infrastructure industry, such as
banking, may adversely affect producers and consumers in other industries. Ideally, a social
welfare function should recognize such cross-industry spillover effects. Another limitation of
our model is that we implicitly assume that whatever security information a firm is willing to
share, it shares it truthfully. However, in the absence of additional incentives, truth telling
may not be an equilibrium outcome as has been shown by Ziv (1993) in the context of trade
associations.31 Despite these limitations, we believe that our model addresses an important
issue, and hope that the proposed approach may be used as a starting point for additional
research in this area.
6 Appendix A
Derivation of Benefit Function
Assume that the utility of a representative consumer when consuming q1 and q2 units of
the two products is
U(q1, q2) = (r1q1 + r2q2)− d1q
2
1
2
− d2q
2
2
2
− zq1q2 + (Y − p1q1 − p2q2).
30Dacey (2003b) outlines some actual levels of information sharing and reporting (to NIPC) going on in
these ISACs.
31We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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where dj > z and the last bracketed term is the consumer’s utility from the consumption of
other products. Then,
∂U
∂qj
= rj − djqj − zqi − pj = 0 i, j = 1, 2 i 6= j. (19)
Hence, the marginal utility from consuming product j increases with rj and declines with
the quantity that the consumer buys of product j as well as the quantity he buys of the
competing product i. The parameter rj reflects the consumer’s appreciation of j
′s product,
which is inversely related to his expectations concerning security breaches that firm j might
experience.
From (19) we get the following two equations
q1 =
(d2r1 − zr2)
(d1d2 − z2) −
d2p1
(d1d2 − z2) +
zp1
(d1d2 − z2) ,
q2 =
(d1r2 − zr1)
(d1d2 − z2) −
d1p2
(d1d2 − z2) +
zp2
(d1d2 − z2) . (20)
Define
ai +Bi =
djri − zrj
d1d2 − z2 b1 =
dj
d1d2 − t2 b2 =
z
d1d2 − t2 .
Hence, from the definition of Bi it follows that
gi(si, sj) = ai + ti − αtj + λdsjtj −
djri − zrj
d1d2 − z2 .
For simplicity, assume that the consumer’s appreciation of product i, as measured by ri,
depends on si but is independent of the value of sj. Hence,
∂ri
∂si
< 0 but ∂ri
∂sj
= 0. As well,
assume that this appreciation declined at an increasing pace when si increases ; thus
∂2ri
∂s2i
< 0.
Finally, assume that the slope of the appreciation parameter when si = 0 vanishes. As a
result,
∂gi
∂si
=
−dj ∂ri∂si
d1d2 − z2 > 0,
∂gi
∂sj
= λ
d
tj +
z ∂rj
∂sj
d1d2 − z2 .
Hence, ∂g
i
∂sj
< 0 if λ
d
tj < −
z
∂rj
∂sj
d1d2−z2 . As well, |∂g
i
∂si
| > | ∂gi
∂sj
| by our assumption that dj > z.
∂2gi
∂s2i
=
−dj ∂2ri∂s2i
d1d2 − z2 > 0,
∂2gi
∂si∂sj
= 0,
∂2gi
∂s2j
=
z ∂
2rj
∂s2j
d1d2 − z2 < 0.
Since z < dj, |∂2gi∂s2i | > |
∂2gi
∂s2j
|. The above specification yields all the restrictions we have
imposed on the “leakage costs” function gi(si, sj).
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Proof of Proposition 1
From the profit function of firm i, we first derive the reduced form version of firm i’s profit
function given by equation (4). From equations (3) and (1), the profit function of firm i is:
Πi = pi qi − f i(ti, yj) = pi (ai − b1pi + b2pj +Bi)− f i(ti, yj),
implying that
dΠi
dpi
= ai − 2b1pi + b2pj +Bi.
The optimal price is then pi =
ai−b1pi+b2pj+Bi
b1
. This then implies that qi = b1pi. Hence,
Π = qi pi − f i(ti, yj) = b1p2i − f i(ti, yj).
From equation (4), the first order condition for the second stage decision variable, that is,
the price leads to the following reaction function
pi(pj) =
ai + b2pj +Bi
2b1
.
Solving these two equations simultaneously we get the following optimal prices
pi =
(2b1ai + b2aj) + (2b1Bi + b2Bj)
4b21 − b22
. (21)
From equation (21), we then have
∂pi
∂ti
=
2b1 + b2(λdsi − α)
(4b21 − b22)
> 0, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
The above inequality holds since α < 1 and b1 > b2. From (21), we also have
∂pi
∂tj
=
(2b1(λdsj − α) + b2)
(4b21 − b22)
.
Under Assumption A1, the above is positive.
Differentiating further the optimal price w.r.t si yields:
∂pi
∂si
=
2b1(−∂gi∂si ) + b2(−
∂gj
∂si
) + b2λdti
(4b21 − b22)
. (22)
Evaluating the above derivative at si = 0 implies that |∂pi∂si |si=0 > 0, by our assumption
concerning the function g(.). Evaluating the above derivative at si = sj = 1, implies that
|∂pi
∂si
|si=sj=1 < 0, by the condition stated in the Proposition. As well, since ∂
2gi
∂si∂sj
≤ 0, the
derivative ∂pi
∂si
is strictly increasing in sj. Hence, if |∂pi∂si |si=sj=1 < 0, it follows that |
∂pi
∂si
|si=1 < 0
for any value of sj < 1, as well. By our assumption that |∂2gi∂s2i | > |
∂2gj
∂s2i
|, it follows that ∂pi
∂si
is
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a strictly decreasing function of si. Hence, there exists s
c
i ∈ (0, 1), where ∂pi∂si = 0, and the
Proposition follows.
Proof of Lemma 1
The proof for the first part follows from equations (5), (6) and (22). The proof for the
second part is embedded in the following proof of Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 2
(i) Since we do not get closed form solutions for the first stage decision variables, we
adopt the implicit function approach to present our results and gain insights. We want to
perform comparative statics of the firm i′s decision variables si and ti w.r.t that of the second
firm decision variables, say sj. Upon total differentiation of equations (5) and (6), we get
the following set of equations.
∂2pi
∂s2i
dsi +
∂2pi
∂si∂ti
dti +
∂2pi
∂si∂sj
dsj = 0, (23)
∂Hi
∂si
dsi +
∂Hi
∂ti
dti +
∂Hi
∂sj
dsj = 0 i, j = 1, 2 i 6= j. (24)
The set of two simultaneous equations for each firm leads us to the following solution for the
derivatives dsi
dsj
and dti
dsj
.

dsi
dsj
dti
dsj
 = −M−1

∂2pi
∂si∂sj
∂Hi
∂sj
 ,
where M =

∂2pi
∂s2i
∂pi
∂si∂ti
∂Hi
∂si
∂Hi
∂ti
. Here,
∂Hi
∂sj
= 2b1
∂pi
∂ti
∂pi
∂sj
+ 2b1pi
∂2pi
∂ti∂sj
− λctj
∂2f i
∂ti∂yj
,
∂Hi
∂si
= 2b1
∂pi
∂si
∂pi
∂ti
+ 2b1pi
∂2pi
∂ti∂si
,
∂Hi
∂ti
= 2b1(
∂pi
∂ti
)2 + 2b1pi
∂2pi
∂t2i
− ∂
2f i
∂t2i
.
From the expression for the optimal prices given in the Proof of Proposition 1, we derive the
following:
∂2pi
∂ti∂si
=
b2λd
(4b21 − b22)
> 0,
∂2pi
∂s2i
= −(
2b1
∂2gi
∂s2i
+ b2
∂2gj
∂s2i
4b21 − b22
) < 0.
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In order to satisfy the second-order conditions and ensure global concavity, the determinant
of M must be positive, and ∂Hi
∂ti
< 0. Further in equilibrium, ∂pi
∂si
= 0, implying that ∂Hi
∂si
> 0
since ∂
2pi
∂ti∂si
> 0.
As well, we proceed to prove that the following expression is positive:
∂pi
∂sj
=
2b1(λdtj − ∂g
i
∂sj
) + b2(−∂gj∂sj )
4b21 − b22
.
From the first order condition ∂pj
∂sj
= 0, we have that −∂gj
∂sj
= b2
2b1
( ∂g
i
∂sj
− λ
d
tj). Hence
∂pi
∂sj
=
2b1(λdtj − ∂g
i
∂sj
) + b2
2b1
(b2
∂gi
∂sj
− b2λdtj)
4b21 − b22
=
λ
d
tj − ∂gi∂sj
2b1
> 0.
Next, from equation (21) we show that
∂2pi
∂ti∂sj
= 0, and
∂2pi
∂si∂sj
=
−2b1 ∂2gi∂si∂sj − b2
∂2gj
∂si∂sj
4b21 − b22
≥ 0,
where the last inequality follows since ∂
2gi
∂si∂sj
≤ 0. Hence, ∂Hi
∂sj
> 0 since ∂
2f i
∂ti∂yj
≤ 0. The above
derivatives help us establish the comparative statics results with respect to sj.
(ii), (iii) In a similar manner total differentiation of equations (5) and (6) with respect
to tj yields : 
dsi
dtj
dti
dtj
 = −M−1

∂2pi
∂si∂tj
∂Hi
∂tj
 .
It is easy to show that ∂
2pi
∂si∂tj
= 0, and
∂Hi
∂tj
= 2b1
∂pi
∂tj
∂pi
∂ti
+ 2b1pi
∂2pi
∂ti∂tj
− λcsj
∂2f i
∂ti∂yj
.
Since ∂
2pi
∂ti∂tj
= 0 and ∂
2f i
∂ti∂yj
≤ 0, a sufficient condition for ∂Hi
∂tj
> 0 is that ∂pi
∂tj
> 0. Further,
∂pi
∂tj
=
(2b1(λdsj−α)+b2)
4b21−b22 . Hence the above is non-negative as long as α ≤ λdsj+
b2
2b1
. By requiring
that α ≤ α¯, we guarantee that ∂pi
∂tj
> 0 for both firms. As a result, ∂Hi
∂tj
is positive for both
firms, and reaction functions are upward sloping w.r.t. tj (i.e.,
∂si
∂tj
> 0 and ∂ti
∂tj
> 0). Note
that the condition α ≤ α¯ is stronger than necessary, since ∂Hi
∂tj
can be positive even when
∂pi
∂tj
< 0.
Proof of Proposition 3
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(i) Similar to the Proof of Proposition 2, upon total differentiation of equations (5) and
(6), we get the following set of equations:
∂2pi
∂s2i
dsi +
∂2pi
∂si∂ti
dti +
∂2pi
∂si∂b1
db1 = 0, (25)
∂Hi
∂si
dsi +
∂Hi
∂ti
dti +
∂Hi
∂b1
db1 = 0. (26)
The set of two simultaneous equations for each firm yields:
dsi
db1
dti
db1
 = −M−1

∂2pi
∂si∂b1
∂Hi
∂b1
 .
∂Hi
∂b1
= 2pi
∂pi
∂ti
+ 2b1
∂pi
∂b1
∂pi
∂ti
+ 2b1pi
∂2pi
∂b1∂ti
.
Now
∂pi
∂ti
=
2b1 + b2(λdsi − α)
4b21 − b22
,
∂pi
∂b1
= −2(4b1pi − (ai +Bi))
4b21 − b22
< 0,
∂2pi
∂ti∂b1
=
2(4b21 − b22)− 8b1(2b1 + b2(λdsi − α))
(4b21 − b22)2
< 0.
The above expressions imply that
∂Hi
∂b1
< 0.
In addition, ∂
2pi
∂si∂b1
= −2∂gi
∂si
< 0. As a result, the comparative statics with respect to b1 are
determined unambiguously. (i.e. ∂si
∂b1
< 0, ∂ti
∂b1
< 0).
(ii) For the comparative statics with respect to b2, we need to establish the signs of
∂Hi
∂b2
and ∂
2pi
∂si∂b2
. Here,
∂Hi
∂b2
= 2b1
∂pi
∂b2
∂pi
∂ti
+ 2b1pi
∂2pi
∂b2∂ti
. where,
∂pi
∂b2
=
aj +Bj
4b21 − b22
+
2b2pi
4b21 − b22
> 0.
Similarly, from (21), the expressions for the derivatives of the equilibrium prices evaluated
at the symmetric equilibrium are given as follows :
∂pi
∂ti
=
2b1 + b2(λdsi − α)
4b21 − b22
> 0,
∂2pi
∂ti∂b2
=
λ
d
si − α
4b21 − b22
+
(2b2(2b1 + b2(λdsi − α))
(4b21 − b22)2
=
4b1b2 + (4b
2
1 + b
2
2)(λdsi − α)
(4b21 − b22)2
.
33
Under the assumption that α ≤ α¯, the above second derivative is positive. In addition,
∂2pi
∂si∂b2
=
λ
d
ti − ∂gj∂si
4b21 − b22
+
(−2b1 ∂gi∂si − b2
∂gj
∂si
+ b2λdti)2b2
(4b21 − b22)2
> 0,
because at the equilibrium, the second term vanishes from equation (22). The comparative
statics with respect to b2 are implied by the above derivatives. Note, once again, that the
assumption α ≤ α¯ is stronger than necessary, since ∂Hi
∂b2
can be positive even when ∂
2pi
∂ti∂b2
is
negative.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof of Proposition 4 is similar to 2 and 3 above and hence it is not repeated for brevity.
We only show the relevant expressions.
∂Hi
∂ai
= 2b1
∂pi
∂ai
∂pi
∂ti
+ 2b1pi
∂2pi
∂ti∂ai
,
∂Hi
∂aj
= 2b1
∂pi
∂aj
∂pi
∂ti
+ 2b1pi
∂2pi
∂ti∂aj
.
Here, ∂pi
∂ai
= 2b1
4b21−b22 and
∂pi
∂aj
= b2
4b21−b22 . This implies that
∂pi
∂ai∂ti
= ∂pi
∂aj∂ti
= 0. Hence,
∂Hi
∂ai
= 2b1
∂pi
∂ai
∂pi
∂ti
> 0 and ∂Hi
∂aj
= 2b1
∂pi
∂aj
∂pi
∂ti
> 0.
(ii)
∂Hi
∂λ
d
= 2b1
∂pi
∂λ
d
∂pi
∂ti
+ 2b1pi
∂2pi
∂ti∂λd
.
Now
∂pi
∂λ
d
=
2b1sjtj + b2tisi
4b21 − b22
,
∂2pi
∂si∂λd
=
b2ti
4b21 − b22
> 0,
∂2pi
∂ti∂λd
=
b2si
4b21 − b22
> 0.
Hence ∂si
∂λ
d
> 0, ∂ti
∂λ
d
> 0. In a similar manner it can be shown that ∂si
∂λc
> 0, ∂ti
∂λc
> 0, since
∂Hi
∂λc
= −[ ∂2f i
∂ti∂yj
]tjsj > 0.
(iii)
∂Hi
∂α
= 2b1
∂pi
∂α
∂pi
∂ti
+ 2b1pi
∂2pi
∂ti∂α
, where
∂pi
∂α
=
−(2b1tj + b2ti)
4b21 − b22
< 0,
∂2pi
∂ti∂α
= − b2
4b21 − b22
< 0,
∂2pi
∂si∂α
= 0.
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The above inequalities imply that ∂si
∂α
< 0 and ∂ti
∂α
< 0.
Proof of Proposition 5
Solving for the inverse demand functions from (3) and (1),
pi =
b1ai + b2aj − (b1qi + b2qj) + b1Bi + b2Bj
b21 − b22
.
At the symmetric equilibrium we have
p =
(a+B − q)
(b1 − b2) .
where B = t(1− α) + λ
d
ts− gi(s, s). Hence total welfare is equal to :
SW =
∫ q∗
0
2
(a+B − q)
b1 − b2 dq − 2f
i(t, λcts),
where q∗ is the quantity at the market equilibrium. Taking the derivative w.r.t. s, the
optimal sSW is given by the solution to
∂SW
∂s
=
∂
∂s
(∫ q∗
0
2
(a+B − q)
b1 − b2 dq − 2f
i(t, λcts)
)
= 0 ⇐⇒
2
b1 − b2
∫ q∗
0
∂B
∂s
dq + 2(
a+B − q∗
b1 − b2 )
∂q∗
∂s
− 2λct
∂f i
∂yj
= 0,
by using Leibnitz Theorem.
At the symmetric equilibrium, q∗ = b1p∗ =
b1(a+B)
2b1−b2 and
∂q∗
∂s
= b1
2b1−b2
∂B
∂s
, where ∂B
∂s
=
λ
d
t− (∂gi
∂si
+ ∂g
i
∂sj
).
Hence we can write this equation as
∂SW
∂s
= 2
[
b1(a+B)(3b1 − 2b2)
(2b1 − b2)2(b1 − b2)
]
∂B
∂s
− 2λct
∂f i
∂yj
= 0. (27)
Since the last term is always positive, it follows that for a fixed t, sSW is bigger than the
value satisfying ∂B
∂s
= 0. When ∂B
∂s
= 0, λ
d
t − (∂gi
∂si
+ ∂g
j
∂si
) = 0. Recall from (22) that in the
market equilibrium the condition which determines the optimal amount of sharing is given
by λ
d
t− (2b1
b2
∂gi
∂si
+ ∂g
j
∂si
) = 0. Since 2b1 > b2, it follows that for a fixed t, s
NE is smaller than
the value satisfying ∂B
∂S
= 0. Hence, sNE < sSW .
In a similar manner, differentiating SW with respect to t as above we obtain
∂SW
∂t
=
∂
∂t
(∫ q∗
0
2
(a+B − q)
b1 − b2 dq − 2f
i(t, λcts)
)
.
By using Leibnitz Theorem and then rearranging terms, we obtain the following FOC for t
b1(3b1 − 2b2)(a+B)
(2b1 − b2)2(b1 − b2)
∂B
∂t
− (∂f
i
∂ti
+ λcs
∂f i
∂yj
) = 0, (28)
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where ∂B
∂t
= 1 − α + λ
d
s. The solution to this equation determines the optimal level of
security technology investment. Compare this to the optimal level of technology investment
under the firms’ individual profit maximization, that solves the following equation :
2b1p
∂pi
∂ti
=
∂f i
∂ti
.
At the symmetric equilibrium, p = a+B
2b1−b2 and
∂pi
∂ti
=
2b1+b2(λds−α)
(4b21−b22) . Hence, the FOC at the
market equilibrium reduces to
2b1(a+B)(2b1 + b2(λds− α))
(2b1 − b2)(4b21 − b22)
− ∂f
i
∂ti
= 0. (29)
When α ≤ α¯, it can be shown that (3b1 − 2b2)(2b1 + b2)(1 − α + λds) > 2(b1 − b2)(2b1 +
b2(λds − α)). Hence, a comparison of equations (28) and (29) implies that for a fixed level
of s, the socially optimal level of technology investment tSW exceeds that obtained at the
market equilibrium under individual profit maximization, tNE. When both s and t are chosen
optimally the above inequalities are reinforced since s and t are strategic complements, when
α ≤ α¯.
From equations (13) and (14) we have the following
∂ΠJP
∂s
=
4b1 (a+B)
(2b1 − b2)2
(
λ
d
t− (∂g
i
∂si
+
∂gi
∂sj
)
)
− 2λct
∂f i
∂yj
= 0. (30)
∂ΠJP
∂t
=
4b1 (a+B)(1− α+ λds)
(2b1 − b2)2 − 2[
∂f i
∂ti
+ λcs
∂f i
∂yj
] = 0. (31)
A comparison of (30) with equation (27, 12) and (31) with equation (28 , 29) when α ≤
α¯, implies that the security technology investment and security information sharing levels
under joint profit maximization lies in between social welfare maximization and the market
(Bertrand Nash) equilibrium. Hence it follows that tNE < tJP < tSP and sNE < sJP < sSP .
Proof of Proposition 6
The Proof follows from comparing equations (15) and (16) with equations (5) and (6)
respectively. The additional terms in equations (15) and (16) are the Stackelberg effects and
prove the result. Since ∂pi
∂sj
∂sj
∂si
> 0 and when α ≤ α¯, ∂pi
∂tj
∂tj
∂ti
> 0 at the levels of simultaneous
mode game, in order to get to the optimum, (s∗i , s
∗
j) and (t
∗
i , t
∗
j) must be higher.
Proof of Proposition 7
(i) The optimal price in this case are given by
pi =
2b1(ai +Bi) + b2(aj +Bj) + 2b
2
1Fi + b1b2Fj
(4b21 − b22)
i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j.
We first derive the relevant expressions here.
∂Bi
∂ti
= 1,
∂Bj
∂ti
= λ
d
si − α, ∂Bi
∂si
= −∂g
i
∂si
,
∂Bj
∂si
= λ
d
ti − ∂g
j
∂si
.
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Next,
∂Fi
∂si
= 0,
∂Fi
∂sj
= −λˆtjδ(ti), ∂Fi
∂ti
= (c− λˆtjsj)δ′(ti), ∂Fj
∂si
= −λˆtiδ(tj), ∂Fj
∂ti
= −λˆsiδ(tj).
As well,
∂pi
∂si
=
2b1(−∂gi∂si ) + b2(λdti −
∂gj
∂si
)− b1b2λˆtiδ(tj)
4b21 − b22
.
Comparing this to equation (22), it is immediate that spillovers on the marginal cost side
reduce willingness to share compared to spillovers on the fixed costs side.
(ii) Next, we have the following.
∂pi
∂ti
=
2b1 + b2(λdsi − α) + 2b21(c− λˆsjtj)δ′(ti)− b1b2λˆsiδ(tj)
4b21 − b22
,
∂pi
∂λˆ
=
−(2b21tjsjδ(ti) + b1b2tisiδ(tj))
4b21 − b22
,
∂Fi
∂λˆ
= −sjtjδ(ti).
From the first order conditions (17) and (18), we can derive the following set of simulta-
neous implicit equations:
(
dsi
dλˆ
dti
dλˆ
)
= −M−1
 ∂2pi∂si∂λˆ
∂Hi
∂λˆ
 ,
where
M =
 ∂2pi∂s2i ∂2pi∂si∂ti
∂Hi
∂si
∂Hi
∂ti
 .
The respective terms within the matrix and their signs are shown below. First we have,
∂2pi
∂si∂λˆ
=
−b1 b2 tiδ(tj)
4b21 − b22
< 0,
∂Hi
∂λˆ
= 2b1
[
(
∂pi
∂λˆ
− ∂Fi
∂λˆ
)(
∂pi
∂ti
− ∂Fi
∂ti
) + 2b1(pi − Fi)( ∂
2pi
∂ti∂λˆ
− ∂
2Fi
∂ti∂λˆ
)
]
.
Now,
(
∂2pi
∂ti∂λˆ
− ∂
2Fi
∂ti∂λˆ
) =
2b21tjsjδ
′
(ti)− b1b2siδ(tj)− b22tjsjδ′(ti)
4b21 − b22
> 0, (32)
∂pi
∂ti
− ∂Fi
∂ti
=
2b1 + b2(λdsi − α)− (2b21 + b22)(c− λˆsjtj)δ′(ti)− b1b2λˆsiδ(tj)
4b21 − b22
. (33)
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Next, we show that
∂2pi
∂si∂sj
=
−2b1 ∂2gi∂si∂sj − b2
∂2gj
∂si∂sj
4b21 − b22
> 0,
∂2pi
∂si∂tj
=
−b1b2tiλˆδ′(tj)
4b21 − b22
< 0,
∂Hi
∂si
= 2b1(pi − Fi) ( ∂
2pi
∂ti∂si
− ∂
2Fi
∂ti∂si
) + 2b1(
∂pi
∂si
− ∂Fi
∂si
) (
∂pi
∂ti
− ∂Fi
∂ti
).
From the first order condition (17), we have ∂pi
∂si
= 0 = ∂Fi
∂si
and ∂
2pi
∂ti∂si
= b2(λd − b1λˆδ(tj)).
Hence
∂Hi
∂si
= 2b1(pi − Fi)b2(λd − b1λˆδ(tj)).
Under the restriction of the second order conditions,∂Hi
∂ti
< 0 and the determinant |M | must
be positive. But, since we are unable to sign (λ
d
− b1λˆδ(tj)) unambiguously, we do not have
the signs of all the terms in the matrix. As is immediate, it depends on the relative ratio of
the spillovers parameters,
λ
d
λˆ
.
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